Stanizai.org

Flirting with Federalism in Afghanistan: Panacea or a Recipe for a Disastrous Disintegration

Zaman Stanizai

zaman.stanizai@my.pacifica.edu

Department of Mythological Studies, Pacifica Graduate Institute, 249 Lambert Road, Carpinteria, California 93013, USA

Department of Political Science, California State University Dominguez Hills, Carson, California 90747 USA

Abstract

Decentralized federalism, proposed as a solution to centralized political power in Afghanistan, has raised concerns among some Afghans who fear it could harbor a covert secessionist agenda. The country's conflicts, which have evolved from resistance to foreign invasions to inter-ethnic proxy wars driven by regional actors, underscore the urgent need for a comprehensive solution. This paper will evaluate federalism's feasibility regarding the viability of such a solution for a nation marked by ethnic diversity and persistent conflict.

Keywords: federalism; Afghanistan; de facto federalism; ethnic federalism; dysfunctional federalism; Mujahideen; warlordism; unitary states; Northern Alliance; ethnic conflict; power distribution; Hassan Shaq; Ahmad Shah Massoud; Dr. Najibullah, People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA); confederation; U.S. Intervention in Afghanistan;

Flirting with Federalism in Afghanistan: Panacea or a Recipe for a Disastrous Disintegration

Clash of Ideas and Identities

Afghanistan's history reflects a complex and tumultuous journey marked by political turmoil and shifting power dynamics. From the Taliban resurgence and consolidation of political power to the intricate interplay of ethnolinguistic identities amid clashes of political ideologies and religious extremism, the country navigates a landscape fraught with multifaceted obstacles through a tapestry of struggles and aspirations.

Afghanistan is a mosaic of ethnic diversity. People with different ethnolinguistic identities blend without being forced through European-style cultural assimilation into a national identity. This concept and other imported social engineering projects aimed at 'nation-building' are far removed from the country's political tradition. Afghanistan is a bowl of salad that refuses to be turned into clam chowder. 

While ethnic diversity enriches the country culturally, it sometimes presents a political challenge for its leadership concerning the concentration and distribution of power. Some have suggested a decentralized federal political system to resolve these problems. In contrast, others believe a constitutional reform aimed at power distribution is a more practical and less risky alternative. These options are theoretically ideal, but their implementation is altogether a different matter.

Over the past fifty years, Afghan leaders have struggled incessantly for political power, yet their attempts to secure and legitimize authority have consistently fallen short. The longer they clung to power without legitimacy, the more susceptible they became to its loss, encapsulating the vicious cycle of power politics in present-day Afghanistan. This quest for legitimacy has sparked significant inquiries into kleptocracy, nepotism, and ethnolinguistic parochialism, hindering the establishment of a transparent governmental framework in both executive and legislative spheres.

The current political framework excessively centralizes power, challenging the government to extend its influence to the periphery effectively. The political system should foster more significant opportunities for political engagement at Afghanistan’s local and rural levels to enhance responsiveness to Kabul's governance and facilitate more effective integration of regional perspectives into national policies.

The traditional diversity of vibrant cultural confluences has historically enriched Afghan society, yet contemporary political tensions have transformed this inherent strength into a vulnerability. The current pressing issue involves proposals that offer impractical solutions to the correctly identified problem of excessive political centralization. While there is consensus regarding the diagnosis, there must be more agreement on the proposed remedies. Two solutions have been put forward:

1.     Constitutional reform to shift power from the central government to regional authorities.

2.     Transitioning from Afghanistan's unitary system to a federal structure to achieve a more equitable distribution of political authority.

Constitutional Reform and Power Distribution

Implementing constitutional reform is more practical, cost-effective, and relatively low-risk than other options. It allows for a critical reassessment of the legal framework, facilitates open discourse to resolve grievances, and adapts to evolving societal challenges. This approach maintains social and political continuity, ensuring stability while addressing governance issues effectively.[1]

Initiating constitutional reform involves convening a convention of legal and political experts to draft a constitution reflecting national norms, traditions, and cultural values. This draft undergoes scrutiny and deliberation by a national assembly for ratification. Subsequently, decentralized power gradually shifts from the central government to provincial, county, municipal, and smaller administrative units. The constitution specifies electoral processes and administrative structures at each level of government, with legal safeguards to prevent abuses and misinterpretations and ensure effective enforcement of constitutional provisions.

Most countries worldwide, including European democracies, pursue constitutional reforms to achieve equitable power distribution and protect civil rights, adapting to evolving societal needs. As Kowal argues regarding the American constitution, “generations of Americans have taken an imperfect Constitution—the product of compromises and an artifact of its time—and made it more democratic, more inclusive, and more responsive to the needs of a changing country through the amending process”[2] These reforms have consistently achieved their objectives without resorting to revolutions or necessitating the establishment of a federal system. In other words, a federal system is neither a prerequisite nor a necessary condition for power distribution. 

In the tension-ridden political space of Afghanistan, the proposal for constitutional reform has yet to garner significant attention in public debates that could amplify its visibility on social media. Conversely, the contentious issue of federalism monopolizes political discourse, sucking up all the oxygen in the political debate space in Afghanistan and shaping the discourse on governance reforms.

Federalism as a Means of Power Distribution

There's a misconception that federalism inherently promotes power distribution, often confusing administrative structures with constitutional principles on power concentration. Ferran Requejo’s terminology distinguishes between unitarianism-federalism and centralization-decentralization axes. A unitarianism-federalism axis focuses on how federal a federation or a regional a state is. In contrast, the centralization-decentralization axis refers to the degree of self-government of the units endowed with political autonomy.^[3]

The varied definitions of federalism lead individuals to select definitions that suit their fancy rather than those suitable for effective societal adoption. Some view it as a vehicle for asserting politicized ethnic identity or as a covert step toward autonomy or secession. These die-hard advocates perceive federalism as ‘ethnic federalism,’ the most prone to failure of all federal systems. Others see federalism as a shortcut to progress, akin to the US system. Yet, for most Afghans, 'federalism' remains an unfamiliar Western concept, akin to 'democracy,' that they don’t understand or believe in.

Given Afghanistan’s ethnic diversity and varying levels of political awareness, any suggestion of federalism requires a nuanced understanding of its feasibility and applicability in such a diverse and politically complex society. There is a dire need for the institutionalization or at least a relative degree of modernization of the Afghan polity. “Afghanistan’s political reconstruction faces a daunting number of hurdles. Institutions must develop at the national, regional, and local levels, and a means for interface among these institutions and between them and an array of international actors must be created.”[4]

In addition to these challenges, most proponents of federalism in Afghanistan need a thorough theoretical grasp of its historical evolution, socio-political prerequisites, and the specific types suitable for Afghanistan. Common misconceptions among advocates include:

1.     The advocacy of federalism in Afghanistan is mainly ideological rather than grounded in theoretical or academic rigor. 

2.     Afghan politicians are oblivious to the complex historical processes required to establish a sustainable federal system. 

3.     They need to recognize that federalism typically emerges early in post-colonial or post-independence states and is seldom a transitional or afterthought phase from a unitary state like Afghanistan, which has a history of over three centuries. 

4.     They suggest a highly idealized solution without any feasibility studies in a society rife with political tensions and armed to the teeth with light weapons.

5.     Some advocates of federalism view it as a norm rather than an exception, not realizing that most of the world’s 173 countries are unitary states.

6.     They push for ethnic federalism to distribute political power among ethnic minorities, often ignoring the susceptibility of ethnic federalism to failure.

7.     Advocates of federalism ignore that the Northern Alliance’s 1992-1994 government of seven regional fiefdoms in Afghanistan had a de facto fragmented federal system, all but in name.

Does Federalism End the Monopoly of Power?

While power concentration remains a critical issue in Afghanistan, advocating for federalism fails to ensure a universal remedy. Several cases demonstrate that implementing a federal system doesn’t consistently achieve the intended goal of distributing power. For instance, in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Russian Federation, centralization and genuine power-sharing challenges persisted despite their federal structures.

In Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito’s monopoly of power was justified through the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat.’ However, after the decline of the proletariat and socialism, Slobodan Milošević's consolidation of power faced substantial challenges. His insistence on staying in power plunged the country into a civil war.  Other ethnic nationalist states easily fall into such a predicament as Bogdan Denitch writes, “examination of various political and human forces also illustrates how ethnic national outcomes in the former Yugoslavia, which has had such devastating impact, can also occur in regions outside of the Balkans”[5]

Vladimir Putin has consistently held president or prime minister positions in the Russian Federation since 1999. As of March 2024, he has been elected to two consecutive six-year terms. Unless the political system undergoes significant changes by the end of his current tenure, his leadership will exceed the durations of any previous Russian president, president of the presidium, or Tsar—including Joseph Stalin. During this extended period, the United States will have seen the tenure of seven or eight presidents by comparison.

Despite his official title, as Myers alludes, Vladimir Putin continues to dominate power within the Russian federal system, often likened to a modern-day tsar.[6] His leadership exerts significant control over all aspects of governance in Russia, overshadowing other constituent republics. Most people can’t even name any other republic in the federation, let alone see their relevance in the political process. 

In some countries, over-centralized federal systems are used to preserve control rather than distribute power. “[L]eaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan have managed to exploit federalism and decentralization as useful instruments to help them preserve control, avoid political instability, and shift blame to the regional authorities in times of crises and policy failures.”[7]

The contrast between the two federal systems of the United  States and the Russian Federation proves no correlation between power concentration and power distribution. 

In France's unitary state and Germany's Federal Republic, empowered citizens enjoy equal access to civil rights and liberties. This demonstrates that legal safeguards and constitutional provisions can ensure political participation, power distribution, and civil rights protection, irrespective of a nation's administrative governance system.

Ideological and Idealized Federalism

Advocacy for federalism often arises from ideological rather than theoretical considerations, where it is used not necessarily for administrative efficiency but more as a vehicle by secessionist factions seeking autonomy or self-governance. Movements like the Québécois in Canada, Scottish Independence, and the Movimentos separatistas na Catalunha in Spain use federalism to achieve specific political goals rather than serve as an end in itself. Due to the risks posed by these movements to national stability and integrity, referenda on federalism have not only failed there, but the implementation of similar initiatives has also been delayed or halted in countries like the Philippines, Ethiopia, Sri Lanka, Syria, and Yemen.

Some Afghan advocates of federalism idealized the American system, overlooking critical differences in political development between Afghanistan and the United States. The American federal system emerged from a historical trajectory characterized by a progression from loosely affiliated colonial entities to independent states operating within a confederation, culminating in adopting a federal system. This evolution was deeply rooted in the historical and geographic circumstances of the American colonies and the development of a distinctive political culture conducive to federalism. Key factors contributing to the success of the American federal system include:

1.     The emergence of a distinct American political identity, integrating politicized identities during the initial stages of state formation in North America.

2.     The establishment of a federal system started with a confederal/federal arrangement among the 13 colonies, each undergoing unique stages of political development.

3.     The guidance of a determined and independent leadership and a cohesive Congress shaped the federal system.

4.     Adaptation of Enlightenment political theories to fit American contexts.

5.     Drawing upon political experiences from other nations.

6.     Advocacy for civil rights and liberties under robust central government laws.

7.     Abundant natural resources that fostered economic development.

8.     Patriotic spirit and motivated workforce driving economic vitality.

9.     Geographic isolation buffering against foreign intervention, ensuring stability and security.

The absence of a comparable historical trajectory and foundational political culture akin to that of the United States suggests that advocating for federalism in Afghanistan based solely on idealized comparisons with the American system is premature and needs a more empirical basis.

Federalism – A Historical Process

The establishment of federal unions has proven successful primarily in large European settlements in the Americas and Australia. This success is attributed mainly to the settlers' departure from their primary ethnolinguistic identities in Europe and their readiness to embrace new political identities upon arrival in these new lands. Additionally, the suppression or elimination of indigenous resistance by these European settlers resulted in the marginalization of native populations and the appropriation of their lands, upon which the federal systems were established. These unique circumstances made horizontal federal arrangements feasible and practical, as the perceived hierarchical identity barriers were effectively mitigated and did not pose significant obstacles to integration.

The establishment of the Swiss Federal State in 1848 and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949 essentially applied a modified settler model on European soil at the height of nationalism. Federalism's success in these contexts underscores the importance of a politically mature culture where primary identities based on language, race, and possibly religion are subordinate to a national identity. This prerequisite is crucial for federalism to function effectively.

It’s essential to recognize that the Swiss and German federal models differ significantly from the assimilationist approaches in settler colonies in that subnational identities such as Bavarian and Berliner remain prominent, reflecting regional diversity within a federal framework. Similarly, linguistic identities such as French and German-speaking Swiss persist in Switzerland. Such a feature of unifying consciousness is often needed in developing countries.

Even within the European political tradition, federalism has been feasible only after a protracted historical evolution. The Old Swiss Confederacy, which existed from 1291 to 1798, underwent centuries of development before transforming into the Swiss Federal State in 1848. The German Confederation, established in 1815, required centuries of political maturation before culminating in the formation of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949. Even the American federal system, formalized with the ratification of the Constitution in 1789, evolved over nearly two decades from its earlier confederate arrangement. These examples underscore that significant political structures, like federalism, necessitate gradual development and cannot be established overnight. Rome wasn’t built in a day.

Federal systems have typically been established during the foundational phases of state-building, particularly in post-colonial societies. This pattern is evident across numerous federal states in America, Australia, the Indian subcontinent, and the Balkans. Conversely, there are no instances where a long-standing unitary state with entrenched historical and political traditions successfully transitioned into a federal system overnight. This historical context underscores the complexities and challenges of restructuring governance frameworks towards federalism. The historical trend favoring a shift towards unitary states after initial attempts at federalism should serve as compelling evidence for federalism advocates regarding the significant risks associated with its implementation.

Federalism in Developing Countries

Most traditional societies need more political experience for federalism. These countries are typically recognized as nation-states primarily for diplomatic purposes rather than due to an evolved politicization as nation-states. In their traditional phase, before nation-state formation, sub-national ethnicity, language, sect, religion, etc., identities pose severe challenges to national identity. Introducing a federal system in such contexts presents a substantial additional hurdle to national integrity.

Advocates of federalism in developing countries often overlook essential prerequisites specific to their contexts. Instead, they frequently reference successful federal models in developed countries, setting unrealistic expectations. This oversight has led to the collapse of at least 14 federal systems, primarily in developing countries, between 1823 and 2006. 

As discussed elsewhere,[8] post-federal disintegrations in Developing Countries have caused terrible human and economic devastations. Here, we will focus briefly on the economic cost of federalism in Afghanistan.

Projected Economic Impact of Federalism in Afghanistan

Despite its relatively manageable population-to-land-mass ratio, Afghanistan is not self-sufficient economically. Most of its natural resources are inaccessible for extraction, and its industrial infrastructure has yet to see the drawing board. The economic costs of federalism will be exacerbated by the country's deep regional economic interdependencies, complicated by the following factors:

1.     Afghanistan's economy relies heavily on regional trade and resources, with significant disparities in development between regions. Implementing federalism could fragment economic policies and hinder coordinated efforts for national economic growth and stability.

2.     Disparities in infrastructure can deepen economic inequalities and hinder efforts to integrate regional economies into a cohesive national framework.

3.     Federalism requires careful management of resources and revenue distribution between the central government and regional authorities. In Afghanistan, where natural resources are unevenly distributed across regions, disputes over resource allocation could exacerbate regional tensions and hinder economic development.

4.     Regional instability and conflicts can disrupt economic activities and deter investment, undermining efforts to achieve sustainable economic growth under a federal system.

5.     Building institutional capacity and ensuring effective governance at both central and regional levels is crucial for the success of federalism. In Afghanistan, where governance capacity varies widely across regions, establishing functional regional governments capable of managing economic affairs effectively remains a significant challenge.

While federalism theoretically offers a framework to address regional diversity and promote local governance, its implementation in Afghanistan is fraught with economic challenges due to the country's intricate regional economic interdependencies.

The Track Record of Federalism in Developing Countries

The following chart outlines the failed federalist experiences in Developing Countries, many of which either disintegrated or survived by reverting to a unitary system of government.

Federal systems that switched to unitary systems[9]

Countries that are federalized through foreign intervention.

Proposed federalization that remains in suspense.

Unitary state that adopted a federal system.

As illustrated above, excluding cases of interventionist imported political engineering and the suspended process of federalism, 13 federal unions in the developing world have transitioned from a federal system to a unitary one. At the same time, only one country has switched from a unitary to a federal system.

Federalism’s Neo-Colonial Legacy

Colonial powers frequently utilized social and political engineering strategies to consolidate and ‘nation-ize’ ethnic/tribal societies or to establish post-colonial client states. Building on their Central Asian neo-colonial blueprint, Russians enticed Afghan minorities with promises of federalism to further their own geopolitical agenda. This tactic inadvertently fostered notions of secession among some ethnic minorities in northern Afghanistan along the Soviet-Afghan border.

The Soviets invaded Afghanistan with the clear objective of turning the country into a Soviet socialist satellite state, as they claimed to have come to Afghanistan to end a civil war. Faced with formidable resistance, they could no longer portray their counter-offensive as a civil war, so they shifted their approach to setting up autonomous republics of ethnic minorities in northern Afghanistan, who would eventually be lured into some degree of integration with their corresponding ethnic republics on the Soviet side of the border. 

The introduction of federalism into Afghan politics by the Soviets was driven by strategic considerations aimed at mitigating the consequences of their own miscalculations:

1.     The defeat of communism at the hands of the Afghan mujahideen deeply unsettled the Soviets, particularly concerning the potential spread of political Islam and its implications for Communist ideologies across Muslim-majority Central Asia.

2.     The Soviets were also concerned about the political ramifications of their military intervention, fearing it would be perceived as an imperialistic aggression rather than a legitimate defense of a socialist government.

Initially, the Soviets disguised their scheme as a 'democratic' reform intended to distribute political power more equitably. Curiously, four decades later, proponents of federalism in Afghanistan use the same justifications to advocate for federalism. 

The first phase of the plan began in 1985 when Russians began sending armed militia of one ethnic group to fight as mercenaries against other ethnicities in different regions of the country. The deliberate instigation of inter-ethnic conflicts was a calculated strategy designed to create conditions that would ultimately justify the establishment of autonomous provinces.

The second phase involved creating autonomous regions in northern Afghanistan under the leadership of Afghan figures sympathetic to Soviet interests. These leaders were chosen based on their ability to cultivate support within their ethnic communities, extending across the border into neighboring Soviet republics. The aim was that they would eventually feel comfortable with the idea and consider it their own cause, as some now do.

Central to this scheme was the promotion of sub-national ethnic identities, which served to undermine the overarching Afghan national identity, perpetuating divisions within Afghan society. Those brainwashed into this ruse still openly defy the national Afghan identity.

Soviet-Proposed Federalism in Afghanistan – 1985

The Russians experimented with covert federalist initiatives by proposing the creation of autonomous regions in northeastern Afghanistan encompassing provinces such as Badakhshan, Takhar, Kunduz, Baghlan, and the Panjshir district under Ahmad Shah Massoud's leadership.

The security of the Kabul-Hayratan highway, which traversed the Salang tunnel, was a crucial supply line for the Soviet military and “was in the crosshairs of Ahmad Shah Massoud's armed men, and the Soviets were able to keep the highway open sometimes through peace and reconciliation and at other times through bloodshed.”^[10]

The Soviets were willing to go to great lengths to keep Massoud content and ensure the security of the highway, even if it meant dividing Afghanistan. This is why meeting Ahmad Shah Massoud's request to create an autonomous Tajik state in the country's northern region became a crucial issue for the occupying forces.

By 1986, the territory of this autonomous state was expanded from 4 to 9 provinces when the Council of Ministers in Kabul tabled the issue and stated that "It was deemed necessary that the nine provinces north of the Hindu Kush, namely Faryab, Jawzjan, Balkh, Baghlan, Kunduz, Takhar, Badakhshan, Saripol, and Bamyan, be placed under a separate administrative unit, headed by Dr. Najibullah Maseer, a member of the Central Committee of the PDPA with the city of Mazar-e-Sharif as its administrative center."^[11] A separate budget allocation request for this autonomous region had been presented by the office of Prime Minister Sultan Ali Keshtmand.^[12]

Following resistance to Moscow's initial federalism plan, the Soviets revealed a second plan four months later. This new plan proposed that Ahmad Shah Massoud would lead an autonomous federal state in northeastern Afghanistan instead. Dr. Sharq was summoned to Moscow, where President Gorbachev informed him, in no uncertain terms, that "Ahmad Shah Massoud is collaborating with us (USSR)."^[13]

By 1987, Massoud sought to establish an autonomous federal entity encompassing nine northeastern provinces of Afghanistan specifically for Tajiks. “With total disregard for the resolution of Wolesi Jirga, the Afghan Parliament "on strengthening the central government," General Gromov, commander of the Soviet 40th Army Division in Afghanistan, with Dr. Najibullah's approval, proceeded to sign an agreement with Ahmad Shah Massoud in Panjshir for the establishment of an autonomous state of Tajiks in the northeast of Afghanistan."^[14]

Massoud also identified the least with the Islamist ideology and always remained focused on the Tajik cause to the point where he even allied himself with the invading Soviet army against the non-Tajik Afghan Mujahideen. He played the jihadi card only so long as American weapons for the jihadis were in the pipeline.

General Boris V. Gromov, recipient of "Order of the Red Banner" for his service in Afghanistan, says he "met Massoud and signed an agreement with him that ensured a safe passage of Russian army through the dangerous Salang and Panjsher valleys and thus onward to the southern, central and eastern Afghanistan. General Gramov says Ahmad Shah Massoud, in return, continued to get Russian assistance. He says Massoud sometimes used to stage sham skirmishes with the Russians to put off chances of suspicion about his activities among other mujahideen groups."^[15] This claim has been verified independently with identical details by many sources, including Bruce Richardson.^[16]

Massoud’s collaboration with the Russians on keeping the Kabul-Hayratan highway safe for the Red Army’s logistical support sustained and prolonged the occupation and exacted an immense human cost in Afghanistan. The interruption of the Russian supply line and military operations would have saved probably a million Afghan lives (1,705,304 population loss estimates based on a 2.34% - 2.5% annual population growth rate for the 1980s),[17] and probably half of the 45 thousand villages would still be standing, resulting in fewer refugees leaving the country and more refugees returning to a self-sufficient lifestyle after the Russian defeat. Contrast that with the frequent Taliban ambushes on American forces along the Kabul-Kandahar highway that earned it the name ‘the highway of death,’[18] that led to the eventual U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. 

It was no surprise that as soon as the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan became certain, Ahmad Shah Massoud switched his jihadi hat for one of the Northern Alliance. He carved out a part of northern Afghanistan comprising nine northeastern provinces as an autonomous federal constituency, apparently with the encouragement of Yuli Vorantsov, the Soviet Ambassador in Kabul, and Commander of the Soviet Ground Forces General Valentin Varennikov.^[19] This plan was implemented through a proposal they signed.^[20] The aim, as the first article of their proposal suggested, was "the creation of an autonomous region for Tajiks within the framework of a united Afghanistan."^[21]

The Russians were supposed to relinquish weapons and ammunition in the north to Shura-e Nazar, Massoud's guerrilla forces, and expel the Afghan national army from this region. Additionally, the Russians were to provide economic aid to Massoud through Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. These nine provinces would form an independent, autonomous region with the condition that it consults the government in Kabul on matters of foreign affairs.

There are differing opinions on whether the autonomy/federal arrangement was initially proposed by Massoud and accepted by the Russians or if it was a Russian initiative that Massoud agreed to. The latter scenario is more in line with the Lenin/Stalin historical 'republic-ization' agenda of Central Asia in the 1920s.

The Post-Soviet Debacle 

When Moscow was ready to cut its losses and leave Afghanistan, it tried to minimize the political fallout of the Russian defeat. It took measures to ensure the Afghan resistance did not pursue them to cross the border; its preventive strategy was aimed at the following objectives:

1. Keep the Afghans embroiled in a civil war by arming and financing ethnic minorities and directing their hostility toward the Pashtun majority.

2. Establish autonomous regions primarily in northern Afghanistan for ethnic groups that straddle the border with the Soviet republics. These autonomous regions will draw closer to their corresponding Central Asian ethnic republics and, by extension, to the Soviet Union. In this way, Soviet adventurism in Afghanistan would have paid off.

Moscow found an unexpected ally in Washington in these efforts. While the United States wished to see Moscow defeated in Afghanistan, it wasn’t prepared to see a victorious Islamist movement empowered in its stead.

In July 1990, "Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze arrived in the Siberian resort city of Irkutsk for talks with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker that will likely focus on a date for the next superpower summit and a possible settlement of the Afghan war… As Shevardnadze arrived… Afghan President Najibullah… was in Sochi on the Black Sea near where Mikhail Gorbachev is on vacation."^[22]

What decisions were made in those secret talks can only be guessed from the actions that followed, including one of deliberately sending a large contingent of Afghan Mujahideen on a path to an assured defeat in Jalalabad.

"At the urging and direction of the U.S. Ambassador in Islamabad, a major mujahideen attack was launched against a well-defended military base near the Jalalabad Airport, which was cordoned off with three lines of minefields. The U.S. "policy shift" thus resulted in the deaths of nearly 2,000 of the best Afghan resistance fighters. It also shifted the momentum and slowed the eventual downfall of the Communist regime in Kabul and disheartened both the Afghan resistance and other liberation movements throughout Central Asia."^[23]

The Northern Alliance De Facto Federalism

With the departure of the Soviet troops, there was a major ideological shift from the global (Islamic) East versus the (decadent) West to localized northern ethnolinguistic minorities versus the southern Pashtun majority in Afghanistan. In essence, a religious ideology was replaced with an ethnic/racial one with the formation of the Northern Alliance, and with it, Afghanistan plunged into a devastating civil war just as the KGB had envisioned it.

After the Northern Alliance seized power with the support of mutinous officers who rebelled against Dr. Najibullah's government, Massoud assumed the role of Defense Minister of Afghanistan under President Rabbani, who ascended to power with the tacit approval of Moscow. It is reasonable to assume that once in control of the entire country, Massoud would have preferred to have power over all of Afghanistan rather than a small region of it. Therefore, he likely put the "federal" project on hold, at least temporarily.

Abandoning the federalist agenda may have caused friction among the Northern Alliance partners, leading to an early breakup when non-Tajik leaders turned against Massoud. This breakup resulted in a very destructive inter-ethnic conflict in the civil war that left Kabul in ruins.

Massoud, speaking as the Defense Minister, acknowledges the specifics of the Vorontsov and Varennikov plan but refutes any involvement or approval, characterizing it as a deceptive Russian proposal that he declined in the best interests of Afghanistan.^[24]

Massoud's denial, however, contradicts published statements by Gromov, Vorantsov, Varennikov, Lyakhovsky, Richardson, Sharq, Moradi, and Aryanfar, among others. His in-depth knowledge of the intricate details also suggests that this decision must have resulted from extensive negotiations with the Russians. The defensive tone in Massoud's voice in the video indicates his need to persuade a skeptical audience, possibly including members of the splintered alliance. As the Defense Minister of Afghanistan, it is understandable that he would speak assertively in opposition to the ‘deceptive Russian proposal.’

President Rabbani's inability and Massoud's unwillingness to share power with other Mujahideen leaders precipitated the fragmentation of Afghanistan into seven quasi-autonomous regions, resembling a de facto federal structure that incidentally aligned with Moscow's strategic objectives. Kabul became emblematic of an ungovernable system characterized by violent turf battles involving cannons, mortars, and rockets. Afghanistan descended into a failed state, mirroring the initial stages of federal system breakdowns in Biafra-Nigeria, East Bengal (Bangladesh)-Pakistan, and Bosnia-Yugoslavia.

During this tumultuous period, each of the seven fiefdoms was governed by warlords who exercised authority over local governance, tax collection, and customs duties and issued binding decrees within their respective domains. Some even negotiated with neighboring countries. These warlords acknowledged the existence of the Rabbani/Massoud administration without recognizing its authority and without sharing their revenues with Kabul. This arrangement effectively established a 'federal state by default,' where decentralized power structures operated independently of central authority.

However unintentional, Massoud’s and his Shura-e Nazar militants' victory was the best thing for Afghanistan under the circumstances, as it prevented the country from the total disintegration that the KGB intended to bring about. Nonetheless, the lingering effects of the Russian plan were evident in what was, in essence, a dysfunctional federal government. Advocates of federalism don’t need to hypothesize about a federal Afghanistan; they only need to review the decade-long reign of the Northern Alliance in the 1990s to see what a federal Afghanistan looked like and self-serving leaders championing the rights of ethnolinguistic minorities self-destructed the state in their own miseries.

While the West celebrated the liberation of Eastern Europe from the grip of communism, achieved at the cost of the lives of countless Afghans, Afghanistan had outlived its practical utility for them. Neither the declining East nor the rising West demonstrated any interest in Afghanistan's well-being as the country descended into political chaos. For many, the emergence of the Taliban in 1994 represented a last glimmer of hope. The Taliban eliminated the warlords and the de facto federalism along with it, reuniting the country and rescuing it from an inevitable collapse.

The people of Afghanistan found themselves in a predicament, having to choose between an undeclared anarchic federalism and an unacknowledged religious despotism. Afghanistan was salvaged from the woes of that de facto federalism by the Taliban in 1996 when they eliminated the warlords, effectively reunifying the fractured nation and averting imminent collapse and chaos. Their ascendancy brought some semblance of stability, albeit at the cost of severe curtailments of people’s civil rights and liberties. The Taliban imposed strict and oppressive measures, mainly targeting women with misogynistic restrictions and imposing a harsh interpretation of Shari’a law.

Regrettably, the Taliban's association with Al-Qaeda and their perceived role in the 9/11 attacks provided a ‘rationale’ for the United States to assert influence in the power vacuum in post-Soviet Central Asia. The U.S. needed an enemy to justify its invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, and the Taliban, known for their archaic views on religion and government, became a convenient target. 

The United States brought back the same warlords who had previously destabilized the country as allies in the fight against the Taliban. Americans were so beholden to those warlords that they integrated them strategically into key governmental roles, ostensibly to safeguard minority rights, but essentially reestablishing the 1992-1996 dysfunctional ethnic federalism that undermined the very objective of ‘national building’ and institution building that the Americans claimed as their objectives.

Americans looked the other way when these warlords challenged the central government in Kabul and were involved in crimes such as ethnic cleansing. "As a result of their close ties with the United States, these crimes have largely been overlooked. After 2001, the United States encouraged warlords' inclusion in key government positions during the transitional administration."^[25]

If the first round of warlordism in the 1990s destroyed Kabul, in the second round, the same warlords trampled on the Afghan national identity under the guise of minority rights and political freedom.

Back to the Future - Incognito

Ahmad Shah Massoud may have considered federalism a tactical maneuver in negotiations with Russians. Still, in their naivety, today’s proponents of federalism assert it as the sole viable model for governing Afghanistan. Their advocacy, while possibly well-intentioned, overlooks the complexities and potential pitfalls inherent in its implementation within Afghanistan's diverse and politically fragile landscape that could potentially destabilize the entire Central Asian region. 

Colonized societies sometimes hold on to colonial traits and legacies long after the colonial power has left the scene, such as the significance of the English language in India, the legal system of Pakistan, the use of the Cyrillic alphabet in Tajikistan, and the Russification of personal names all over Central Asia. In that vein, some Afghan minds are stuck in the Russification of political agenda in Afghanistan, i.e., the advocacy of federalism with its not-so-hidden secessionist agenda and the defying of the Afghan national identity.

Today’s Tajik extremists talk about more than the autonomy of five or nine provinces Massoud bargained for with the Russians; instead, they appeal to the expansionist sentiments in today’s Iran and consider the entire northern half of Afghanistan as Tajik—a Persianate corridor that bridges Tajikistan with today’s Iran. To that end, the Tajik identity is redefined, encompassing anyone proficient in the Dari Persian, the lingua franca in Afghanistan, overlooking the distinction that while all Tajiks may speak Dari, not all Dari speakers identify as Tajiks. More extremist factions consider any non-Pashtun a Tajik by default. This redefinition of ethnic boundaries based solely on linguistic proficiency reflects a broader foreign agenda. 

These Tajik extremists reject the Afghan identity by equating it deliberately with Pashtuns, reinforcing a public misconception of ethnicizing the national identity. Instead, they identify themselves as Khurasani, the historical regional name encompassing parts of today’s Iran, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. This selective adoption of a historical term serves their political agenda by emphasizing regional and ethnic affiliations over national unity, contributing to the fragmentation of Afghanistan along ethnic lines.

Federalism, not in name but in actuality, is what the Russians introduced through regional autonomy in the 1980s, the Northern Alliance warlords brought it in the 1990s, and the Americans re-introduced it as nation-building in the 2000s. In reality, all these dispersive government systems were, in essence, variations of failing federalism that validate Einstein’s hypothesis of insanity, “doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.”

Demagoguery in a Warrior Culture

In a warrior culture characterized by a thirst for power, individuals seek to assert their influence in the political sphere. When unable to achieve national power, they often settle for regional authority, where their control remains unchallenged. This dynamic explains why regional and ethnic federalism in Afghanistan aligns with their agenda.

In Afghanistan, warriors transfer their battlefield skills to the political arena. The psyche of most political leaders is forged either on the actual battlefield or not far from it. Warlords coax their words to manipulate the minds of their followers through deceptive slogans. The abundance of light weapons turns these otherwise civilian groups into belligerent militias. Consequently, the average Afghan may have trouble defining federalism, but they angrily raise their fists, demanding it as a panacea.

Most warlords aging out of their military/political battlefields groom their children to take over, making ‘warlordism’ hereditary and intergenerational, much like the Lebanese confessional democracy. This doesn’t bode well for the prospects of political stability in Afghanistan, even without federalism.

In such an internecine conflict-ridden society, personality cults are carved out of the bedrock of destructive imported ideologies where paper tigers with lofty but rarely deserving titles are deified beyond recognition. However, when push comes to shove, these goliaths fall by the wayside with a wisp of political change. Then, these warriors for hire wait for an offer from the next interventionist power.

The instability in Afghanistan is also attributed to the prevalence of kleptocracy, an attempted de facto federalism justified as an advocacy of ethnolinguistic rights. Under the American tutelage, for instance, when a provincial warlord/governor did not yield the seat of a provincial governorship to an appointee of the central government, the central government’s legitimacy was questioned. Incidences of such disregard for the authority of the Republic of Afghanistan contributed to its collapse in 2021. 

The persistent assaults on the cohesive Afghan national identity by opportunistic politicians and self-styled champions of ethnicized "sub-cultural" identities exacerbate societal divisions and fuel inter-ethnic animosities. Under-educated Afghans, including certain proponents of ethnic federalism, fall prey to external propaganda and become vulnerable to unwittingly forsaking their national Afghan identity.

Resolving Afghanistan’s myriad problems fundamentally hinges on ending the protracted conflict. While initial conflicts in Afghanistan may have stemmed from foreign invasions or interventions, their persistence can largely be attributed to the meddling and proxy engagements of neighboring states. These external dynamics exacerbate inter-ethnic tensions, armed conflicts, and civil unrest. 

The prevalence of 'warlordism' adds certainty to such a fiasco where warlords "form coalitions with competing warlords and local tribal leaders to present the central government with a challenge, and often the state will bargain to gain access to resources or 'rent,’ loyalty from the warlord and peace in the region."^[26]

Worse still is the kleptocracy these warlords have made fashionable that grows into a hereditary ethnolinguistic 'warlordism' legitimated in the name of defending minority' rights' instead of civil rights or human rights—a situation somewhat analogous to the Lebanese confessional democracy. Warlords aging out of their military/political battlegrounds now groom their children to take on the mantle and embody their parents' traits. In this sense, warlordism has become an inter-generational phenomenon. This doesn’t bode well with the prospects of political stability in Afghanistan, even without federalism.

In such an internecine conflict, personality cults are carved out of the bedrock of destructive imported ideologies where paper tigers with lofty but rarely deserving titles are literally deified beyond recognition. When push comes to shove, these goliaths fall by the wayside with a wisp of political change.^[27]

Since most wars are imposed through foreign interference, these leaders tacitly and subconsciously do the bidding of foreign and regional powers during and after foreign invasions, regional interventions, and proxy wars.  In essence, warlordism is created and sustained by warring parties with the power to do so.

Case in point: the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and the re-introduction of warlords to

the political arena. As much as the United States condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, it invited a sense of déjà vu when it followed in the footsteps of the Russians. Like the Soviets, the Americans launched their operation from military bases in Uzbekistan and invaded Afghanistan from the north with the help of the Northern Alliance warlords. 

In addition to these warlords, rogue elements who challenged every semblance of law and order in the country were armed and trained. "The CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies created paramilitary forces that operated totally outside the authority of Afghan security institutions…. The highly secretive paramilitary unit has been implicated in civilian killings, torture, questionable detentions, arbitrary arrests and use of excessive force in controversial night raids, and abuses that have mostly not been previously disclosed."^[28]

A recent New York Times investigation reveals that "The Americans empowered warlords, corrupt politicians, and outright criminals in the name of military expediency. It picked proxies for whom the ends often justified the means."^[29]This investigation is based on "more than 50,000 handwritten complaints kept in ledgers by the former U.S.-backed government… details of almost 2,200 cases of suspected disappearances… nearly 400 cases, often with eyewitnesses to the abductions…."^[30]

Human Rights Watch speaks of abuses by government military officials and their agents. "Perpetrators are rarely held to account, and the victims are rarely able to gain legal redress. This impunity hinges on the inability or unwillingness of the Afghan government and its institutions, including the military, police, and courts, to challenge the strongmen and militias who operate throughout much of the country."^[31]

 As the U.S. withdrawal plan from Afghanistan was approaching, it became evident that mirroring the Russian withdrawal plan could have led to a potentially more chaotic and bloody civil war than the one experienced in the 1990s. This further strengthened the Taliban's position as the only entity capable of preventing another failed-state scenario.

When, in a knee-jerk reaction, Trump announced the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, CIA policymakers scrambled for an alternative to intelligence-gathering and counterterrorism capabilities. Much like the Russians, the Americans considered engaging the warlords.^[32] It appears that the U.S. withdrawal plan from Afghanistan bore striking similarities to the Kremlin playbook, potentially setting the stage for the empowerment of the same corrupt warlords previously supported by the CIA.

The hasty implementation of this prerogative would have undoubtedly ignited another round of ethnic civil war. The emphasis on ethnocentric loyalties had already posed a significant challenge during the American 'nation-building' project. The potential for a chaotic scenario had been anticipated even before the fall of the regime. "Most former jihadi commanders have ethnically based militias. Supporting one group or another exacerbates political divisions and undermines the central government's credibility and authority. After the withdrawal of U.S. and international forces, supporters for these warlords and political factions could help foster a multi-front civil war."^[33]

The concern extended beyond the unraveling of a decentralized political system; it encompassed the dread of gross human rights violations and unspeakable horrors that these warlords would inflict during the ensuing ethnic civil war. "The United States entered Afghanistan on one side of an ongoing civil war…[but] has since 2001 consistently subordinated human rights and good governance to short-term political objectives, partnering and funding Afghan warlords who used their new power to target not just the Taliban, but local rivals."^[34]

While Trump's reckless troop withdrawal announcement was detrimental, Biden's mishandled implementation further aggravated the situation. Ironically, it was the Taliban who, in this tragic zero-sum game, seemingly saved the day once again. Consequently, Afghans paid a high price, sacrificing their civil rights and liberties at the altar of gender-targeted draconian decrees and misogynistic restrictions that retarded Afghanistan by centuries.

The Menace of Regional Interventionism

To a large extent, national boundaries in the region reflect colonial legacies where some ethnic communities straddle these boundaries, spawning territorial disputes and irredentist claims. These dynamics set the stage for a zero-sum game where any threat to the geographic integrity of one country becomes an expansionist opportunity for its neighbors. In such a scenario, neighboring countries will likely adopt preemptive and aggressive strategies rather than defensive or neutral postures to mitigate unanticipated repercussions of regional instability. This proactive stance exacerbates regional tensions and leads to heightened militarization and conflict escalation across the broader Central Asian region.

When war profiteers and arms dealers play on the conflict-driven chessboard, Afghans often become expendable pawns sacrificed to advance foreign political agendas. This geopolitical reality underscores the precarious position of Afghanistan, where internal debates over federalism are entangled with external agendas.

For nearly half a century, Afghanistan has been struggling in the quicksands of perpetual civil wars, foreign invasions, and pervasive external interference. The involvement of neighboring states in Afghan affairs has effectively undermined the feasibility of implementing any political reforms involving federalism, rendering such endeavors even more precarious.

Even in the absence of external meddling, the inherent challenges stemming from the political immaturity of its leadership and the deeply polarized social conditions within its ethnically diverse society suggest that any attempt to federalize Afghanistan would likely lead to disastrous outcomes. De-centralizing political power, which federalism aims to address, could be overshadowed by the heightened risks of societal fragmentation and governance paralysis.

Conclusions

The objectives of a federalist agenda are undoubtedly rooted in legitimate pluralist concerns like power distribution, human rights, civil liberties, equal employment opportunities, etc. However, the ultimate success of such an agenda hinges on a well-thought-out plan and a nurturing, receptive political environment. A nation must meet specific prerequisites before it jumps head-on into federalism. Such miscalculations have turned many dreams into horrible, bloody nightmares.

The ethnolinguistic diversity and pronounced sub-national identity loyalties, alongside simmering regional tensions within Afghan society, present formidable obstacles to establishing a decentralized federal administration akin to that in the United States, Germany, or Switzerland.

When considering federalism in countries with similar levels of socio-political development as Afghanistan—such as Nigeria, Congo, Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Pakistan-Bangladesh, the Central American Federation, Yugoslavia, and Rwanda—the prospects appear even bleaker. Prospects of a federal Afghanistan could be metaphorically described as "Rwanda on steroids."

Afghanistan underwent a significant transformation following the promulgation of a relatively liberal 1964 Constitution. This constitutional era marks a period of burgeoning political counterculture from the far left to the far right. The monarchy's demise in 1973 ushered in a pivotal shift, as these ideological currents transitioned from grassroots movements on the street to influential forces within the corridors of governmental power—the far left 1978-1992 and the far right 1992-2001.

It will take a lot of de-programming, re-education, and robust civic engagement in the political process before 'moderation' enters the annals of Afghan politics. The current landscape is marked by tension and radicalization, and the polarized political psyche is miles away from any federalist experimentation.

Afghan society must significantly develop its political culture to effectively engage with a decentralized political system. Transitioning a war-torn country with a shattered economy, fragmented political leadership, and profoundly polarized society into uncharted political experiments poses substantial risks and raises ethical concerns. Such a shift requires a stable foundation of governance, robust institutions, and widespread civic participation to ensure legitimacy and effectiveness.

Establishing a federal administrative system demands a higher socio-political consciousness, a higher level of literacy and education, and more effective political mobilization than is currently prevalent in Afghanistan. Otherwise, the population will be vulnerable to the interventionist agendas of foreign forces that would exploit cross-border ethnolinguistic affinities to serve their irredentist agendas. Afghanistan lacks the economic, political, and military robustness to counter such threats decisively. 

For all these reasons, the problem of power concentration in Afghanistan can best be resolved through an amendable constitutional reform that safeguards against the monopoly of power through mechanisms such as term limits for political offices, proactive citizen participation, and the like. Such a meaningful constitutional reform can devolve administrative responsibilities and power distribution to smaller units at the provincial, prefectural, municipal, and village council levels.

If Afghan society can elevate its political consciousness to prioritize national unity over ethnolinguistic loyalties, there may come a time when exploring decentralized federalism becomes viable. Given Afghanistan's present level of political development, proposing federalism is premature, imprudent, short-sighted, and reckless. Even if Afghanistan hypothetically met all necessary conditions for federalism, implementing ethnic-based federalism in such a profoundly interconnected society would likely face insurmountable challenges. Any attempt to establish a federal system under these conditions could initiate a destabilizing trajectory rather than fostering cohesive governance. Thus, carefully considering Afghanistan's social dynamics and political maturity is essential; otherwise, any attempt at forming a federal system will begin a slippery slope from somewhere to nowhere.

Bibliography

Ahmed, Azam and Matthieu Aikins. ‘America’s monster.’ The New York Times, (May 22, 2024) https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/22/world/asia/afghanistan-abdul-raziq.html?campaign_id=9&emc=edit_nn_20240522&instance_id=124115&nl=the-morning&regi_id=100404579&segment_id=167417&te=1&user_id=6badc9a500740c04427e9b7b30b0e089

Busygina, Irina and Mikhail Filippov. Non-Democratic Federalism and Decentralization in Post-Soviet States, (London: Routledge, 2023). ISBN# 9781003267508. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9781003267508/non-democratic-federalism-decentralization-post-soviet-states-irina-busygina-mikhail-filippov

Denitch, Bogdan Denis. Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia. (University of Minnesota Press, 1966), 1.

Dressel Björn. Strengthening Governance through Constitutional Reform, The governance Brief Asian Development Bank, (July 2005)  https://www.adb.org/publications/strengthening-governance-through-constitutional-reform

Gossman, Patricia. Doing Human Rights in Afghanistan Right this Time, (Responsible Statecraft, May 27, 2021) https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2021/05/27/how-to-support-human-rights-in-afghanistan/

Human Rights Watch. “Today We Shall All Die,” (March 3, 2015) https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/03/03/today-we-shall-all-die/afghanistans-strongmen-and-legacy-impunity

Kowal, John F. Perfecting the Constitution: Are amendments the way forward for progressive reformers? Brennan Center For Justice, (February 14, 2023) https://www.brennancenter.org/experts/john-f-kowal

Lyakhovsky, Alexander Antonovich. (Gen.), Operation Storm 333 in Afghanistan, Шторм-333 trans. Sahib Nazar Moradi, (May 17 2023). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Storm-333

Myers, Steven Lee. The New Tsar: The Rise and Reign of Vladimir Putin. (Simon & Schuster Ltd UK ed, 2016).

Massoud, Cherik. Russian Attempts to Deceive Commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, (Video speech). https://twitter.com/cherik_massoud_/status/1671455645520764929

Mukhopadhyay, Dipali. Warlords, Strongman Governors, and the State in Afghanistan, (New York: Cambridge University Press. 2014) 316–340. ISBN 9781107023925

Noorzoy, M. Siddieq. The Afghan Economy During the Soviet War, (Xlibris, 2016), 175, ISBN # 978-1-5144-5695-1.

North, Douglass C., Wallis, John Joseph, Weingast, Barry R. “Violence and the Rise of Open-Access Orders,” Journal of Democracy, (January 1, 2009) 55–68. doi:10.1353/jod.0.0060. ISSN 1086-3214. S2CID 153774943.

Pazhwak, Barmak. Asma Ebadi, and  Belquis Ahmadi. After Afghanistan Withdrawal: A Return to ‘Warlordism?’ (United States Institute of Peace, June 25, 2021) https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/06/after-afghanistan-withdrawal-return-warlordism

Requejo, Ferran. Is Spain a Federal Country? 50 Shades of Federalism. (2017), http://50shadesoffederalism.com/case-studies/spain-federal-country/

Rosen, James. Shevardnadze and Baker to discuss summit, Afghan war, (UPI Archives, July 31, 1990) https://www.upi.com/Archives/1990/07/31/Shevardnadze-and-Baker-to-discuss-summit-Afghan-war/1529649396800/

Raghavan, Sudarsan and Lorenzo Tugnoli. Along Afghanistan’s ‘highway of death,’ the bombs are gone but suffering has deepened, (The Washington Post, December 20, 2021).

Raghavan, Sudarsan. CIA runs shadow war with Afghan militia implicated in civilian killings. (The Washington Post, December 3, 2015) https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/cia-backed-afghan-militias-fight-a-shadow-war/2015/12/02/fe5a0526-913f-11e5-befa-99ceebcbb272_story.html

Richardson, Bruce G. Afghanistan: ending the reign of Soviet terror, (Norway: Lillestrom, 1996) https://unomaha.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/discovery/fulldisplay/alma991007795119706390/01UON_OMA:UNOMAHA

Sharq, Mohammad Hassan. Prime Minister of Afghanistan under Presidents Daud and Dr. Najibullah. Author’s interview with Dr. Sharq (July 4, 2023).

Sharq, Mohammad Hassan. Procrastination in National Reconciliation, trans. Zaman Stanizai (2024), 92.

Stanizai, Zaman. From Identity Crisis to Identity in Crisis in Afghanistan, The Middle East Institute Policy Brief No. 27, Washington, D.C. December 16, 2009) https://www.mei.edu/publications/identity-crisis-identity-crisis-afghanistan

Stanizai, Zaman. The Allure and Predicaments of Federalism for Developing Countries. (Cambridge University Press Open Engage, 17 October 2023) https://www.cambridge.org/engage/coe/article-details/652588b58bab5d20550cf8a6

The News International - BUREAU REPORT. Ex-Soviet commander unveils Massoud's secret pact., (May 17, 2001),http://www.rawa.org/massoud3.htm

Thier, Alexander and Jarat Chopra. The Road Ahead: Political and Institutional Reconstruction in Afghanistan, Third World Quarterly, Vol 23, no. 5, (2002): 893-907. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3993394

Varennikov, Valentin Ivanovich. Deputy Chief of the Soviet General Staff for direct oversight of operations in Afghanistan, (Encyclopedia.com: May 19, 2023). https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/varennikov-valentin-ivanovich

Vorontsov, Yuli. Soviet Ambassador to Afghanistan at the time of the Soviet troop withdrawal. (April 5, 2023), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yuli_Vorontsov

Wikipedia. List of countries by federal system. (2024, May 17). In Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_federal_system